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1 Introduction
This article considers the case where conservation in any country is a world-
wide externality (e.g. through biodiversity). Because there is no benevolent
international government, conservation management must be delegated to a
potentially self-interested regulator. A key question then is how many policy
tools are required or efficient in that management and what to do if there
are alternative tools. Tinbergen (1952) tells that there must be at least one
policy tool for each and every policy target. He also notes that additional
(“supplementary” or “complimentary”) tools are often required to control
side-effects or otherwise bolster a “primary” tool. Are regulatory standards
sufficient, or should subsidies as well be used in conservation?
This article is motivated by the following experience. The European Com-
mission (EC) manages biodiversity by the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC on
the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. That direc-
tive established the Natura 2000 network of protected sites. It provides for
the inclusion of protected areas under the Birds Directive (Art. 3, Directive
92/43/EEC) and Community co-financing for sites which are of importance
for the Community (Art. 8, Directive 92/43/EEC). What is the role of regu-
latory standards and co-financing in biodiversity management in that case?
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) show that the total variety of species in a
habitat is an increasing function of the area of that habitat. Swanson (1994),
Barbier and Schulz (1997) and Endres and Radke (1999) consider the opti-
mal area of a habitat when the variety of species yields utility, comparing the
benefits of maintaining the habitat with those of using land in production.
Barrett (1994), Swanson (1996), Sarr et al. (2008), Gatti et al. (2011) exam-
ine biodiversity management in an economy where some countries (called the
“South”) are highly endowed with biodiversity, while the others (called the
“North”) are the primary location of the research and development industries
relying upon these resources. In this article, I assume that all countries are
endowed with resources that can contribute an international public good (e.g.
biodiversity). Winands et al. (2013) examine the possibility for cooperative
biodiversity agreements when the economy consists of heterogeneous coun-
tries. In constrast, I consider the political economy solution where countries
lobby the self-interested regulator that performs conservation management.
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Lobbying can be modeled either by the all-pay auction model, in which
the lobbyist making the greater effort wins with certainty, or by the menu-
auction model, in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the
politician’s actions. In the all-pay auction model, lobbying expenditures
are incurred by all the lobbyists before the regulator takes an action.1 In
the menu-auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money
and effort on lobbying without getting what he has lobbied for. Because
this article examines the case where the regulator’s decision variables (e.g.
regulatory constraints, subsidies) are continuous and the interest groups (e.g.
countries) obtain marginal improvements in their position by lobbying, the
menu-auction model is a proper basis for the study.
Palokangas (2013) examines biodiversity management in the case where
identical countries produce the same good and perform R&D. He shows that
if the subsidies are financed by a distorting consumption tax, then the intro-
duction of subsidies harms welfare. In contrast in this document, I examine
a more relevant case where the countries are heterogeneous, but simplify the
analysis by replacing R&D by government input to production as an alter-
native source of employment. To focus on the heterogeneity of the countries,
I assume that taxation is non-distorting.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the structure of
the model. Section 3 considers the behavior of the firms, countries and
households. Section 4 constructs the Pareto optimum as a point of reference.
Section 5 present the self-interested regulator. The political economy of
regulation without subsdies is examined in section 6 and that with subsidies
in section 7. The results are summarized in section 8.
2 The economy
In the economy, there is a large number (“continuum”) of countries within the
limit [0, 1]. Because conservation in any country yields common externality,
there is a self-interested regulator that manages conservation. To obtain an
equilibrium with lobbying, I assume that if country i ∈ [0, 1] doesn’t not
involve in conservation management, then it pays a penalty ξj > 0 to the
1For instance, in Johal and Ulph (2002), local interest groups lobby to increase the
probability of getting their favorite type of government elected.
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other countries. All countries i ∈ [0, 1] supply the same good, which is
chosen as the numeraire in the model, derive utility from consumption and
conservation, and lobby the regulator by their political contributions. In this
setup, I examine what is the efficient package of tools for the regulator.
Country i allocates its given labor Li between production li and public
services zi and its given natural resources Ni between production ni and
conservation bi:
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Li = li + zi, Ni = ni + bi. (1)
There are two stages of production. First, the local government of each
country i ∈ [0, 1] produces public services zi from labor according to constant
returns to scale and finances this by local taxes. Second, local firms produce
their output yi from labor li, natural resources ni and public services zi
according to the thrice differentiable and strictly concave function
yi = f
i(li, ni, zi), f
i
l > 0, f
i
n > 0, f
i
z > 0, f
i
ll < 0, f
i
nn < 0, (2)
where the subscripts l, n or z denote partial derivatives of f i with respect to
l, n or z, correspondingly.3
The political economy of environmental policy is expressed as an ex-
tensive form game with the following stages: (I) The lobbies influence the
regulator, relating their prospective political contributions to the latter’s
decisions. (II) The regulator decides its policy and collects political contri-
butions. (III) The countries conserve habitats and produce public services.
(IV ) The firms produce the good. This game is solved in reverse order:
stages (IV ) and (III) in section 3 and stages (II) and (I) in 6 and 7.
2I assume that the quantity of natural resources in country i, Ni, is a scalar. With
some complication, the model can be generalized for the case where Ni is a vector of many
habitats in country i ∈ [0, 1], but this does not qualitatively contribute to the analysis.
3It is is necessary to introduce some other source of employment than private pro-
duction to observe the difference of regulatory standards and subsidies in conservation
management. Palokangas (2013) uses R&D for that purpose, but this complicates his
model so much that he can consider only the case of identical countries. In this document,
I use the demand for labor in government services for the same purpose.
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3 Firms, countries and households
The regulator has the following country-specific tools. First, it determines
the minimum amount mi of natural resources (called hereafter the regulatory
standard) that must be devoted to conservation:
bi ≥ mi with mi ∈ [0, Ni] for i ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
Second, it can provide “co-financing” for protected sites (cf. Art. 8, Directive
92/43/EEC). This is modeled as an ad valorem subsidy si to natural resources
being used for conservation over and above the regulatory standard, bi−mi.4
To finance these subsidies, the regulator is allowed to collect a uniform tax t
from all countries. To keep that tax non-distorting, let it be the poll tax,
tk = tLk for k ∈ [0, 1], (4)
where Lk is the given labor supply in country k.
Firms use natural resources ni up to the level at which the rent ri for
these is equal to the marginal product of these, ri = f
i
n(li, ni, zi) [cf. (2)].
The subsidy base in country i, V i, is then equal to the rent ri times conserved
resources over the regulatory standard, bi −mi, in that country. Noting (1)
and (2), that base can be defined as follows:
V i(zi, bi,mi)
.
= ri(bi −mi) = (bi −mi)f in(li, ni, zi)
= (bi −mi)f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi), V im .=
∂V i
∂mi
= −f in < 0,
V iz
.
=
∂V i
∂zi
= (bi −mi)(f inz − f iln), V ib .=
∂V i
∂bi
= f in − (bi −mi)f inn > 0. (5)
Because each country i ∈ [0, 1] pays political contributions Ri to the
regulator, the latter receives total contributions
R
.
=
∫ 1
0
Ridi. (6)
Noting (1), (2) and (5), one obtains the revenue in country i:
pii(zi, bi,mi, si, ti +Ri)
.
= yi + siri(bi −mi)− ti −Ri
= f i(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + siV i(zi, bi,mi)− ti −Ri, ∂pii
∂mi
= siV
i
m, (7)
4I assume that a direct subsidy to the quantity bi of a habitat is incentive incompatible.
Therefore, the regulator rather bases the subsidy si on the value (5) of that habitat.
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where yi is output, si the subsidy for the value ri(bi − mi) of conserved
resources bi over and above the standard mi, ti a tax and Ri contributions
that are paid to the regulator. Country i determines public services zi and
controls conserved resources bi by local taxes that do not appear in the net
revenue (7) of the country.
If country i involves in conservation management, then it maximizes its
revenue (7) by public services zi and conserved resources bi subject to the
regulatory constraint (3). This leads to the following equilibrium conditions
(cf. Appendix A)
Πi(mi, si, ti +Ri)
.
= max
zi, bi≥mi
pii(zi, bi,mi, si, ti +Ri), (8)
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
=
∂pii
∂(ti +Ri)
= −1, ∂Πi
∂si
=
∂pii
∂si
= V i, (9)
siV
i
z (zi, bi,mi)− f il (Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + f iz(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) = 0, (10)
siV
i
b (zi, bi,mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)
{
= 0 for bi > mi,
< 0 for bi = mi,
(11)
∂Πi
∂mi
= si
[
V im(zi, bi,mi) + V
i
b (zi, bi,mi)
]− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi). (12)
Given (2) and (11), the regulatory constraint (3) is binding without a subsidy:
−f in < 0, bi
∣∣
si=0
= mi,
∂bi
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= 1. (13)
Because the production function (2) is thrice differentiable, the subsidy base
(5) is twice differentiable and the first-order conditions (10) and (11) define
diffentiable response functions for country i (cf. Appendix A):
zi(mi, si), bi(mi, si),
∂bi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=0
> 0. (14)
In other words, a small subsidy si to conservation increases resources bi de-
voted to conservation.
If country i does not involve in conservation management, then it pays
the penalty ξi, but does not obtain the subsidy, si = 0, and avoids paying
taxes, regulatory standards and political contributions, ti = mi = Ri = 0. In
that case, its revenue is the constant [cf. (7)]
pii = max
zi, bi≥0
f i(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)− ξi = max
zi
f i(Li − zi, Ni, zi)− ξi. (15)
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Total consumption c is the sum of the outputs yi of all countries i ∈ [0, 1]
[cf. (1) and (2)]:
c
.
=
∫ 1
0
yidi =
∫ 1
0
f i(li, ni, zi)di =
∫ 1
0
f i(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)di. (16)
To avoid distributional considerations, I examine the representative house-
hold of the whole economy. This derives utility u from consumption c and the
conserved natural resources of all countries, {bi} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]}, according
to the function
u(c, {bi}), ∂u
∂c
> 0,
∂u
∂bi
> 0 for i ∈ [0, 1], u strictly concave. (17)
4 Pareto optimum
Given the response functions (14) of the regions i ∈ [0, 1], a benevolent
regulator can control both conserved resources bi and public services zi by
the regulatory standard mi and the subsidy si throughout all countries i ∈
[0, 1]. It maximizes the welfare of the representative household, (17), by the
instruments {bi} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]} and {zi} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]} subject to total
consumption (16). This leads to the first-order conditions [cf. (2) and (16)]
∂u
∂c
∂c
∂zi
= (f iz − f il )
∂u
∂c
= 0 and
∂u
∂bi
+
∂u
∂c
∂c
∂bi
=
∂u
∂bi
− f in
∂u
∂c
= 0 for i ∈ [0, 1].
These in turn can be written as the Pareto optimality conditions :
f iz = f
i
l for i ∈ [0, 1], (18)
∂u
∂bi
/
∂u
∂c
= f in for i ∈ [0, 1]. (19)
Efficiency of production, (18), says that the marginal product must be
the same for both private labor li and government labor zi in every country
i ∈ [0, 1]. Efficiency of conservation, (19), says that, in each country i ∈ [0, 1],
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and natural resources
must be the same in utility and production.
Plugging the condition (18) into the equilibrium conditions (10) of the
countries i ∈ [0, 1] yields that the subsidies si corresponding to the Pareto
optimum are zero for all countries i ∈ [0, 1]. In other words:
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Proposition 1 The benevolent regulator does not introduce subsidies, si = 0
for i ∈ [0, 1].
5 The self-interested regulator
Given taxation (4), the definition of the opportunity cost, (5), and the re-
sponse functions (14) of the countries i ∈ [0, 1], the regulator’s budget is
t
∫ 1
0
Lkdk =
∫ 1
0
siribidi =
∫ 1
0
siV
i
(
zi(mi, si), bi(mi, si)
)
di, (20)
where t
∫ 1
0
Lkdk is total tax revenue and
∫ 1
0
siribidi total subsidies. The
budget constraint (20) defines the tax t as a function of the policy variables
{mk} .= {mk| k ∈ [0, 1]} and {sk} .= {sk| k ∈ [0, 1]} as follows:
t
({mk}, {sk}), ∂t
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]
= 0,
∂t
∂si
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]
=
V i∫ 1
0
Lκdκ
. (21)
To avoid distributional considerations that result from the payment of
contributions Ri, i ∈ [0, 1], I assume that all countries i ∈ [0, 1] and the
regulator belong to the representative household.5 Consumption c is then
equal to the revenues pik from countries k ∈ [0, 1] plus the regulator’s revenue
R [cf. (4) and (8)]:
c =
∫ 1
0
pikdk +R =
∫ 1
0
Πk(mk, sk, tLk +Rk)dk +R. (22)
The regulator maximizes household utility (17) by its policy parameters
{mi} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]} and {si} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]} subject to the tax func-
tion (21) and consumption (22), given the contributions Ri of the regions
i ∈ [0, 1] as functions of the policy parameters. The remainder of this article
considers two cases: regulation without and with subsidies.
5The assumption of the common representative household implies that the marginal
utility of income is the same for the regulator and the countries. The alternative is the
model of Dixit et al. (1997), in which the regulator’s utility W (u,R) is an increasing
function of both the household’s utility u and total political contributions R. With that
extension, distributional considerations would complicate the analysis, without any qual-
itative impact on the results that concern the subsidies and regulatory stardards.
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6 Regulation without subsidies
Assume that there are no subsidies, and consequently no tax, si = t = 0 for
i ∈ [0, 1], so that the regulatory standards {mi} .= {bi| i ∈ [0, 1]} are the only
policy instruments. The revenue of country i, (8), then becomes [cf. (2), (9),
(11) and (12)]
Πi(mi, 0, Ri),
∂Πi
∂mi
= −f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi),
∂Πi
∂Ri
= −1, bi = mi. (23)
Furthermore, given si = 0, from the equilibrium condition (10) of a region it
follows that
f iz(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) = f il (Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) for i ∈ [0, 1]. (24)
Country i maximizes its revenue (23) by its contribution function Ri(mi)
[cf. (iii) in Appendix B]:
mi = arg max
mi
Πi
(
mi, 0, Ri(mi)
)
. (25)
Given the contribution functions, total contributions (6) become
R =
∫ 1
0
Ri(mi)di. (26)
The regulator maximizes its utility (17) by its policy {mi} subject to the
utilities of countries, (25), and total contributions (26) [cf. (ii) in Appendix
B]. This condition can be written as follows:
{mi} = arg max{mi} u(c, {mi}) with c =
∫ 1
0
Πi(mi, 0, Ri)di+
∫ 1
0
Ri(mi)di.
(27)
The equilibrium condition of country i, (25), is equivalent to the first-
order condition
0 =
∂Πi
∂bi
+
∂Πi
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂mi
.
Given (23), this can be written also as follows:
∂Ri
∂mi
= − ∂Πi
∂mi
/
∂Πi
∂Ri
=
∂Πi
∂mi
= −f in. (28)
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Conditions (28) say that in equilibrium the change in the contributions of
country i, Ri, due to a change in any instrument mi equals the effect of
that instrument on the revenue of that country, Πi. These contribution
schedules are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to a globally
truthful contribution schedule that represents the preferences of country i at
all policy points (cf. Dixit et al. 1997) as follows:
Ri = max[Πi − pii, 0], (29)
where the integration constant pii is the opportunity revenue of country i in
case it does not pay contributions, Ri = 0, but the regulator chooses its best
response, given the contribution schedules of other countries k 6= i [cf. (15)].
Given (28), the regulator’s equilibrium conditions (27) are equivalent to
the first-order conditions
0 =
∂u
∂mi
+
∂u
∂c
∂Ri
∂mi
=
∂u
∂mi
− f in
∂u
∂c
for i ∈ [0, 1]. (30)
The conditions (24) and (30) are equivalent to the Pareto optimality condi-
tions (18) and (19). In other words:
Proposition 2 Without subsidies, regulation leads to the Pareto optimum.
7 Regulation with subsidies
Assume that each country i can credibly commit itself to its contribution
function Ri(mi, si) with any strategy (mi, si). Country i maximizes its rev-
enue (8) by its contribution function Ri(mi, si), given the tax function (21):
(mi, si) = arg max
mi,si
Πi
(
mi, si, t
({mk}, {sk})Li +Ri(mi, si)). (31)
These are equivalent to the first-order conditions
0 =
∂Πi
∂mi
+
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
∂Ri
∂mi
, 0 =
∂Πi
∂si
+
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
∂Ri
∂si
.
Given (9) and (12), these equations can be written also as follows:
∂Ri
∂mi
= − ∂Πi
∂mi
/
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
=
∂Πi
∂mi
= si
(
V im + V
i
b
)− f in,
∂Ri
∂si
= −∂Πi
∂si
/
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
=
∂Πi
∂si
= V i. (32)
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Conditions (32) say that in equilibrium the change in the contributions
of country i, Ri, due to a change in any instrument (mi or si) is equal to
the effect of that instrument on the revenue of that country, Πi. Thus, the
contribution schedules are locally truthful. This concept can be extended to
a globally truthful contribution schedule that represents the preferences of
country i at all policy points. Given (32), the truthful contribution func-
tions are Ri = max[Πi − pii, 0], where the revenue pii of country i with no
contributions Ri = 0 is the same (15) as before.
Given the contribution functions, total contributions (6) become
R =
∫ 1
0
Ri(mi, si)di. (33)
The regulator maximizes its utility (17) by its policy {mk, sk} subject to the
contributions it receives, (33), the response functions (14) and the behavior
(31) of the countries i ∈ [0, 1]:
{mi, si} = arg max{mi,si}u(c, {bi(mi, si)}) with
c =
∫ 1
0
Πκ
(
m∗κ, s
∗
κ, t
({mk}, {sk})Lκ +Rκ(m∗κ, s∗κ))dκ+ ∫ 1
0
Ri(mi, si)di,
(34)
where the optimal values m∗i and s
∗
i of the maximization (31) must be taken
as given. Defining the function U({mi, si}) .= u(c, {bi(mi, si)}) and noting
(9), (32) and (34), one obtains that
∂U
∂mi
=
∂u
∂c
{
∂Ri
∂mi
+
[∫ 1
0
∂Πκ
∂(tκ +Rκ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
Lκdκ
]
∂t
∂mi
}
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
=
∂u
∂c
[
si
(
V im + V
i
b
)− f in − (∫ 1
0
Lκdκ
)
∂t
∂mi
]
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
for i ∈ [0, 1],
(35)
∂U
∂si
=
∂u
∂c
{
∂Ri
∂si
+
[∫ 1
0
∂Πκ
∂(tκ +Rκ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
Lκdκ
]
∂t
∂si
}
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
=
∂u
∂c
[
V i −
(∫ 1
0
Lκdκ
)
∂t
∂si
]
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
for i ∈ [0, 1]. (36)
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Given (13), (21), (35) and (36), it holds true that
∂U
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]
=
∂u
∂c
[
−f in −
(∫ 1
0
Lκdκ
)
∂t
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
si=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= −f in
∂u
∂c
+
∂u
∂bi
for i ∈ [0, 1], (37)
∂U
∂si
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]
=
∂u
∂c
[
V i −
(∫ 1
0
Lκdκ
)
∂t
∂si︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
+
∂u
∂bi
∂bi
∂si
=
∂u
∂bi︸︷︷︸
+
∂bi
∂si︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
(38)
Given (10) and (37), the Pareto optimality conditions (18) and (19) hold true
with zero subsidies, sk = 0 for k ∈ [0, 1]:
∂U
∂mi
∣∣∣∣
sk=0∀k∈[0,1]
=
∂u
∂bi
− f in = 0,
(
f iz − f il
)
si=0
= 0.
However, the inequality (38) shows that this cannot be the equilibrium: be-
cause the possibility to set subsidies improves the regulator’s bargaining po-
sition, the regulator has incentives to increase the subsidies si of all countries
i ∈ [0, 1] above zero. Noting (14), this promotes conservation, ∂bi
∂si
> 0 in all
countries i ∈ [0, 1]. The results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Conservation subsidies are welfare decreasing, leading to ex-
cessive conservation.
The international budget for distributing subsidies increases the regulator’s
bargaining power and political contributions it receives from the countries.
Consequently, the regulator introduces subsidies that distort the allocation
of labor between the private and government sectors.
8 Conclusions
This article considers an economy where the conservation of environmental
resources yields utility through conservation. Firms make goods from labor
and natural resources, benefiting from public services. The countries produce
public services from labor and lobby the regulator that runs conservation
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management. The policy instruments consists of regulatory standards and
the subsidies to conserved resources over and above those standards, with
the latter being financed by non-distorting taxes.
The main findings are the following. Lobbying for regulatory standards
alone leads to Pareto efficiency. The international budget for distributing
subsidies increases the regulator’s bargaining power and political contribu-
tions it receives from the countries. Consequently, the regulator introduces
subsidies, although these distort the allocation of labor between the private
and government sectors. These results, however, depend on two realistic
assumptions: first, there are public inputs to production in the countries;
and second, the regulator has interests of its own. If there were no public
services, then all labor would be employed in production and the subsidies
could not distort the the allocation of labor. On the other hand, a fully
benevolent regulator would not introduce conservation subsidies alongside
regulatory standards.
Furthermore, the analysis is based on two simplifying assumptions. The
first of these is that there are only non-distorting taxes. Given the result of
Palokangas (2013), a distorting revenue-raising tax would lead to Pareto inef-
ficiency, which strengthens the result of this article. The second assumption
is that the regulator belongs to the representative household. This clarifies
the results, for changes of income distribution due to political contributions
do not affect efficiency in the model. Alternatively, one could use the model
of Dixit et al. (2007), in which the regulator’s utility is an increasing function
of both the household’s utility and the political contributions. This extension
would complicate the analysis, without nullifying the results of this article
concerning the subsidies and regulatory stardards.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretical model is used to derive results on conservation manage-
ment, the following conclusion seems nevertheless to be justified. Applied
to NATURA 2000, the power to set regulatory standards is appropriate in
the EU. If there is any reason to believe that the policy makers in the EU
have interests of their own, the use of “co-financing” alongside regulatory
standards in conservation management can decrease welfare.
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Appendix
A Results (8), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (14)
Country i maximizes maximizes
pii(zi, bi,mi, si, ti +Ri)
.
= f i(Li − zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
li
, Ni − bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ni
, zi) + siV
i(zi, bi,mi)− ti −Ri
(39)
by (zi, bi) subject to bi ≥ mi. The Lagrangean for this maximization is
Λ
.
= pii + λ(bi −mi), (40)
where the multiplier λ satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
λ ≥ 0, λ(bi −mi) = 0. (41)
Noting (39) and (40), one obtains the first-order conditions
∂Λ
∂zi
=
∂pii
∂zi
= siV
i
z (zi, bi,mi)− f il (Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + f iz(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi)
= 0, (42)
∂Λ
∂bi
=
∂pii
∂bi
+ λ = siV
i
b (zi, bi,mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) + λ = 0. (43)
Condition (42) is equivalent to (10). Noting (39), (40), (41) and (43), one
can define the function (8),
Πi(mi, si, ti +Rt)
.
= max
zi,bi≥0
pii = max
zi,bi
Λ,
with the properties
∂Πi
∂si
=
∂Λ
∂si
=
∂pii
∂si
= V i,
∂Πi
∂(ti +Ri)
=
∂Λ
∂(ti +Ri)
=
∂pii
∂(ti +Ri)
= −1,
∂pii
∂bi
= siV
i
b (zi, bi,mi)− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi) = −λ
{
= 0 for bi > mi,
< 0 for bi = mi,
∂Πi
∂mi
=
∂Λ
∂mi
=
∂pii
∂mi
− λ = siV im − λ
= si
[
V im(zi, bi,mi) + V
i
b (zi, bi,mi)
]− f in(Li − zi, Ni − bi, zi),
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which are equivalent to (9), (11) and (12).
Finally, consider the case bi > mi. Then, λ = 0 holds by (41) and the
second-order conditions are
∂2pii
∂z2i
< 0, J .=
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2pii
∂b2i
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∂2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0. (44)
Furthermore, from (5), (42) and (43) it follows that
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f iln − f inz,
∂2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f ill − 2f ilz + f izz,
∂2pii
∂b2i
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= f inn,
∂2pii
∂bi∂si
= V ib = f
i
n − bif inn,
∂2pii
∂zi∂si
= V iz = bi(f
i
nz − f iln) = −bi
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∣∣∣∣
si=0 .
(45)
Given (2), (44) and (45), one obtains
∂bi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=0
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂
2pii
∂bi∂si
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∂2pii
∂zi∂si
∂2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂
2pii
∂bi∂si
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
−bi ∂2pii∂bi∂zi ∂
2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2pii
∂bi∂si
+ bi
∂2pii
∂b2i
− bi ∂2pii∂b2i
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
−bi ∂2pii∂bi∂zi ∂
2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ −bi
∂2pii
∂b2i
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
−bi ∂2pii∂bi∂zi ∂
2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣− 1J
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2pii
∂bi∂si
+ bi
∂2pii
∂b2i
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
0 ∂
2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣
=
bi
J
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2pii
∂b2i
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∂2pii
∂bi∂zi
∂2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣− 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ f in − bif inn + bif inn ∂
2pii
∂bi∂zi
0 ∂
2pii
∂z2i
∣∣∣∣∣
= bi︸︷︷︸
+
− 1J︸︷︷︸
+
f in︸︷︷︸
+
∂2pii
∂z2i︸︷︷︸
−
> 0.
B The lobbying game
Following Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this
game is a policy ζ and a set of contribution schedules R1(ζ), ..., Ri(ζ) such
that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ri are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, U i ≥ 0.
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(ii) The policy ζ maximizes the regulator’s welfare taking the contribution
schedules Ri as given.
(iii) Country i cannot have a viable strategy Ri(ζ) that yields it a higher
level of utility than in equilibrium, given the others’ contributions.
(iv) Country i provides the regulator at least with the level of utility as in
the case in which it offers nothing (Ri = 0), and the regulator responds
optimally given the contribution functions of the other countries.
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